Reframing Domestic Violence as Terrorism or Torture by Marcus, Isabel
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-2014 
Reframing Domestic Violence as Terrorism or Torture 
Isabel Marcus 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Domestic and Intimate Partner Violence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Isabel Marcus, Reframing Domestic Violence as Terrorism or Torture, 67 Collection of Papers, Faculty of 
Law, Niš 13 (2014). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/647 
This work is licensed under a 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 








** The topic of this article is based on the paper I.Markus “Reframing “Domestic Violence”: 
Terrorism in Home” published in: M.Fineman, B.MyKitiuk (eds.), The Public Nature of Private 




REFRAMING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS 
TORTURE OR TERRORISM**
Abstract: This paper focuses on the analysis of the phenomenon of domestic 
violence and the distinctive features for which is it may be recognized as a 
specific	form	of	torture	and/or	terrorism	at	home.	The	author	provides	an	
overview	of	the	scientific	debate	among	feminist	authors	on	this	conception	
which has given rise to an innovative approach to understanding the concept 
of	domestic	violence.	Underscoring	the	substantive	similarity	of	domestic	
violence	with	the	acts	of	torture	and/or	terrorism,	the	author	urges	for	state	
action arguing that domestic violence as a form of gender-based violence 




Sometime in 1992, my dear, now deceased friend, women’s rights lawyer, and 
law professor colleague, Rhonda Copelon, and I had an extended conversation 
in which we agreed that, as we were committed to recognizing the sex/gen-
der-specific aspects of domestic violence and its deep connection to women’s 
worldwide inequality, we also were thinking about the merits and legal advanta-
ges of broadly reframing the rapidly developing women’s rights issue of intimate 
partner/domestic violence to elicit its commonalities with other well-defined 
forms of violence - more specifically, torture or terrorism. Rhonda argued for 
the use of the category of ‘torture’ and its near relative of ‘cruel, inhuman and 
Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 67 | Година LIII | 2014
14
degrading’ treatment (Copelon, 1994). I found arguments for exploring the ca-
tegory of ‘terrorism’ (Marcus, 1994). The conversation was a thought-provoking 
one; it ranged from the content of existing human rights norms to legal proce-
dural considerations that might follow from such a reframing. We concluded by 
agreeing that we needed to pursue the implications of our respective positions.
At the time, in some countries and in international human rights fora, feminist 
activists and advocates had made some headway in developing the category of 
gender-based violence—violence against women because they are women as an 
unequivocal human rights violation. That violence included rape in all settings 
from conflict zones to the marital bed, honor killing, and domestic/intimate 
partner systemic violence (likely to occur in the home, a culturally identified 
the ‘safe’ and ‘appropriate’ place for women). These activists noted that the 
number of victims of gender-based violence exceeds those of war and of brutal 
dictatorships. (Copelon, 1994: 292). In 1992, the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women published its General Recommendation No. 19, 
on violence against women.1 In 1993, at the Second World Conference on Human 
Rights held in Vienna, women’s advocacy groups succeeded in placing violence 
against women on the agenda. The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 
generated by the conference, stressed the importance of working towards the 
elimination of violence against women in public and private life.2
As academics and activists, Rhonda and I in our respective teaching and NGO 
work relied on feminist analyses of domestic violence which rest on premises 
that “the vulnerability of women as a group to the violence is caused by a combi-
nation of (1) traditional news about male and female roles and hegemony which 
may make it difficult for authorities to oppose violence in a relationship…; (2) 
the private nature of systemic intimate violence…; (3) the concomitant escala-
tion of extreme violence upon separation; (4) economic difficulties restraining 
women’s freedom; and (5) the acquiescence of the victim’s community to the 
violence.” (Meyersfeld, 2010: 124). 
We independently had come to the conclusion that a reframing would enhance 
feminist efforts to relocate the legal issue of domestic violence, which hitherto 
had been identified as occurring in the private sphere of home and family—a 
posture that protected perpetrators from state intervention and legitimate 
the partial or total impunity they enjoyed (Copelon, 1994: 297). Since one of 
the most important state justifications for inaction was the prevailing culture, 
which persistently trivialized the violence as the chastisement or disciplining 
1  74 UN Doc.HR/GEN/1 (1992).
2  Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, Section II B, para 38, UNDOC.A/Conf 157/24, 
12, July 1993.
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of women (Copelon, 1994: 296), we believed that such a reframing could help to 
transcend these deeply-rooted cultural protections accorded to perpetrators 
and assist in the world wide campaign for the transcultural and transnational 
indictment of domestic violence. Reframing, we believed, could move beyond 
prevailing many of the simplistically reductionist explanations for the violence 
to an analysis of the political and cultural context of gender-based power and 
control in order to generate state action (Marcus, 1994: 34).
In effect, our suggestions of connecting domestic violence to torture or terrori-
sm were not deflections or diversions from the goal of expanding the women’s 
rights canon, but rather directed at a fuller understanding of domestic violence 
as a social and individual choice to do harm.3 We recognized that even though 
both torture and terrorism are unique in their egregiousness, our purpose was 
to educate about commonalities as well as sex specific aspects” (Copelon, 1994: 
299). Our concern was whether privately inflicted gender violence would be 
treated unequivocally as a human rights violation and as one giving rise to en-
forceable as opposed to precatory4 state responsibility. (Copelon, 1994: 294-295).
Like other feminist legal theorists, we understood that even as domestic violence 
occurs worldwide in different settings and cultures, and is affected by race/
ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, disability, and immigrant or refugee status, 
such violence has universal properties. First, that the violence is connected to 
‘harmful’ masculinity (Anderson, 2008) - social and cultural patterns of conduct 
and practice associated with gender. Second, that it violates women’s dignity, and 
bodily and psychological integrity. Third, that it often involves intentional con-
duct. Fourth, that it is practiced with impunity because perpetrators are rarely 
punished and, in so many cases, there are few, if any, remedies for the suffering 
inflicted upon the woman survivor/victim. Fifth, that women abused by their 
spouses/partners are likely to be silent about domestic violence - a testament 
to the power of patriarchal5 culture associated with shaming, stereotyping 
and stigmatizing those who publicly disclose the violence. Sixth, that women’s 
relationships to society and the state are widely medicated through men and 
3  Acts of systemic intimate violence include:  punching; shouting; battering; biting; burning; 
hacking; electrocution; starvation; mutilation; sleep deprivation; forced sexual touching; 
forced sexual activities with third parties; poisoning; exposure; property destruction; murder, 
withholding medical care; threats of harm; threats to remove children; threatening to use 
a lethal weapon; persistent shouting; unrelenting accusations of infidelity; controlling day 
to day activities; isolation; and threats of suicide. (Meyersfeld, 2010: 115).
4  Precatory is defined as requesting, recommending or expressing a desire for action but 
usually in a non-binding way. Garner, B. (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 2009.
5  In ideology and practices, patriarchy, the world-wide dominant governing sex/gender 
regime, addresses issues of control over the infliction of violence and, when warranted, 
redress for violence deemed illegal or illegitimate in law or cultural practice.
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patriarchy constitutes men as a parallel state in many women’s lives (Copelon, 
1994: 299). Seventh, that the worldwide incidence and frequency of domestic 
violence are ‘dark numbers’.6 (Marcus, n.d.).
In 1994, Rhonda Copelon wrote a signature article “Recognizing the Egregious 
in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture”. My essay “Reframing “Domestic 
Violence”: Terrorism in the Home was published in the same year in a volume 
discussing the public nature of private violence. 
In 2014, twenty years after Rhonda and I had written our respective articles, 
I decided to revisit them. Fully aware that in the interval between our conver-
sation and the present, an enormous amount of scholarly and activist work at 
domestic, regional and international levels has enriched our understanding of 
domestic violence (or intimate partner violence) I asked myself several questi-
ons. What can be learned by revisiting these two articles, written in a different 
period when domestic violence, though integrated into the women’s rights canon 
as women’s right to be free from gender-based violence as well as other violence, 
was still a contested subject in the broad international human rights canon? Were 
our efforts ultimately mere symbolic gestures generated by the frustration of 
hearing domestic violence normalized, naturalized, mocked, disregarded, dis-
missed, or ignored in popular discourse as well as in legal system proceedings? 
2. Discussion of the Literature 
2.1. Domestic Violence, Torture, and Terrorism
Strategically, Copelon’s reframing of domestic violence as torture or cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment had the advantage of recognition under an in-
ternational human rights legal umbrella — the making of the International 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment7 made torture “non-derogable”.8 In addition, torture has as an 
extensive historical pedigree replete with admittedly chilling details of various 
inventive practices in different societies. Although the drafters of the internatio-
nal UN Convention Against Torture and the Inter-American Torture Convention9 
did not have gender-based violence in mind, they did expand the concept of state 
involvement in torture beyond active complicity to include passive involvement 
in privately inflicted torture including individual violence (Copelon, 1994: 297). 
6  In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, phenomena known to exist but unrecorded 
or undocumented were called dark numbers.
7  The International Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.
8 Not respectable or abrogatable by later law to limit the utility and force of a provision.
9  Inter-American Convention to Prevent & Punish Torture OAS/Serv. L/V/I.4rev (2000).  
I. Marcus | стр. 13-24
17
Both forms of state involvement, Copelon argues, are “broad enough to embrace 
the failure of government to redress domestic violence (Copelon, 1994: 355). In 
her analysis, domestic violence as torture encompasses a broader range of cases 
than servitude which is outlawed under international law. Conversely, domestic 
violence of lesser severity clearly qualifies as cruel inhuman and degrading tre-
atment which, in human rights law, encompasses less severe forms of (official) 
violence (Copelon, 1994: 298). The distinction between torture and domestic 
violence does not lie in the severity of the experience or the tendency to differen-
tiate physical and mental brutality. It flows from the different degrees to which 
society recognizes both physical and psychological brutality and suffering in the 
two (private and public) contexts complicated by gender (Copelon, 1994: 324-
325). Her primary goals are to challenge the assumption that intimate partner 
violence is a less severe and terrible form of violence than that perpetuated by 
the state (Copelon, 1994: 352) and to trigger a range of state responsibilities. 
She seeks to determine whether torture and domestic violence are “equivalently 
heinous” (Copelon, 1994: 308).  
She recognizes that understanding the battery and sexual abuse of women by 
their intimate partners—perhaps the most common and dangerous form of 
gender-based violence—as torture, thereby giving rise to obligatory internati-
onal and national responsibilities, is a ‘hard case’ from the conventional human 
rights lens. But, it is an obvious one from women’s experience (Copelon, 1994: 
295). Consequently, she embarks on a well-developed comparative analysis 
examining the methods, goals, context, and effects of torture and of domestic 
violence. She is mindful of the caveat that just as torture is affected by diffe-
rences in political, social, economic, and gendered contexts, so, too, in domestic 
violence women are marked by differences (racial or ethnic, class, culture and 
sexuality) (Copelon, 1994: 299). 
Torture involves intentional infliction of pain against the will of the victim 
(Copelon, 1994: 315). It, thereby, ascribes culpability to the aggressor (Copelon, 
1994: 325) - either the state through its agents or non-state actors using torture 
in conflict situations. In her review of international legal standards concerning 
torture, she notes that individual malice is not necessary and loss of control is 
not exculpatory (Copelon, 1994: 328). The use of torture is an abuse of power and 
an offense against human dignity (Copelon, 1994: 320) regardless of whether the 
contention is that its purpose is to elicit information (Copelon, 1994: 331-333), 
to punish, (Copelon, 1994: 333-337), to intimidate (Copelon, 1994: 337-339), for 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind (Copelon, 1994: 339-340), or to 
obliterate the personality or diminish capacities (Copelon, 1994: 341). So, too, is 
domestic violence an abuse of power for a profoundly similar variety of reasons. 
In both instances, these purposes violate human rights norms. Therefore, she 
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concludes, the application of Convention Against Torture to domestic violence 
is appropriate and warranted.10
Fourteen years after Copelon published her article, the second thematic report11 
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture to the UN Human Rights Council has aut-
horitatively categorized domestic violence as a form of torture. It confirms that 
the purpose element requirement is always fulfilled in gender-specific violence 
against women which is inherently discriminatory12 and that the continuum of 
harm is a process. 
In “Reframing Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home,” my analysis develops 
the commonalities between domestic violence and terrorism. Terrorism, like 
torture, also is widely condemned in the international human rights canon. 
But, it is not the subject of a treaty instrument.13 It encompasses collectively 
oriented strategies and practices of coercive violence on targeted populations 
to generate high levels of public anxiety. Copelon refers to family traditions of 
punishing disobedience and disciplining by loss of liberty (both integral compo-
nents of the rationale for domestic violence) as a culture of terror (Copelon, 1994: 
293). In later domestic violence literature, domestic violence is characterized 
as ‘terroristic control’ to underscore the scope of the control tactics used by the 
perpetrators of the violence. (Johnson, 1995: 285-86).
I argue that terrorism relies on three fundamental tactics to terrorize individuals 
(and populations) and, thereby, enhance perpetrators’ credibility: unannounced 
and seemingly random, but, actually, calculated attacks of violence; psychological 
as well as physical warfare aimed at silencing protests and minimizing retalia-
tory responses from the targets of violence; and the creation of an atmosphere 
of intimidation in which there may be no truly safe place to which the targets 
10  Copelon also considers arguments for domestic violence as an independent human rights 
violation given its historic invisibility trivialization, particular character and effects (360) 
and for law gender-based violence as jus cogens which embraces values of supreme, overriding 
and fundamental importance to the international community thereby taking precedence 
over treaties to the contrary, and being non-derogable (p. 365-367).
11  UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Manfred Novick: Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, 
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Including the right to Development (15 
January 2008) UNDOC A/HRC/7/3.
12  Special Rapporteur on Torture, 2008 Report, para 68.
13  The U.N. has produced a number of General Assembly resolutions on terrorism Including 
UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy UNGAOR 65th Session, Agenda Item 150, UN Document 
A/Res/65/297 8 September 2010 and Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism UNGAOR 
65th Session Agenda Item 107, UN Document A/Res/65/34 6 December 2010 ‘with particular 
alacrity and consistency since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
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can escape - thereby making it difficult to judge when and whether targeted in-
dividuals are safe or at risk. Personal identity and human connection are deeply 
compromised; they are replaced by a widespread sense of insecurity, passivity, 
and defeatism (Marcus, 1994: 31-32).
That said, not all persons, who become targets of terrorism, respond in similar 
ways or even in a consistent manner over time. Nor are conventional general 
categories of class, race, or ethnicity accurate predictors of individual respon-
ses to the violence. Moreover, characterizing the targets of terrorism as either 
only victims or only resisters risks overstructuring or overdefining them. Some 
targets may respond with acts directed against the perpetrators of the violence; 
other targets may consider their very survival as a challenge to the terrorism; 
yet others may succumb to understandable feelings of defeat and denial (Mar-
cus, 1994: 32).
I contend that there are striking parallels and similarities between terrorism as 
a strategy used to destabilize a community or society consisting both of women 
and men, and domestic violence abuse perpetrated against women. Violence 
against women in intimate partnership relationships is designed to exercise and 
maintain domination and control, to enhance or reinforce advantages, and to 
defend or maintain privileges. As targets of domestic violence, many women live 
in a world punctuated by violent, traumatic and/or catastrophic events, some of 
which are predictable and others unpredictable—tailored by the perpetrator 
to the domestic intimate context. These events include threats and humiliation, 
stalking, surveillance, coercion, and physical or psychological violence. Whether 
that violence is identified as the imposition of discipline, as a strategy of family 
governance, or as an act of the assertion of masculinity, women can be kept in 
their culturally and socially designated ‘place’ as well as threatened with or 
actually lose their social attachments. For many victim/survivors the perpe-
trator often appears to be omnipotent and omniscient. 
“Just as persons caught in situations of politically inspired terrorism display a 
range of responses to the fear and tragedy it generates, so too, women whose 
experience in intimate partnering situations is marked by violence demonstrate 
a variety of behaviors and coping mechanisms for their situation.” (Marcus, 
1994:33). That said, the reaction to such traumatic or catastrophic events expe-
rienced by many targeted women is more than fear for their immediate safety 
or the safety of their children. The trauma of the violence governs, guides, or 
influences their actions and decisions. In such situations, survival becomes a 
form of resistance to domestic violence terrorism (Marcus, 1994: 32-33).
Unlike targets of politically inspired terrorism or torture, however, women, who 
are targeted in domestic violent relationships, often do not elicit sympathy or 
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respect for the oppression they face. All too often, there is a conceptual shift to 
a focus on the nature and extent of their “provoking” the violence and abuse. 
This shift is of crucial significance. It disconnects the violence from the social, 
cultural, economic, and political context of sex-gender domination and subor-
dination. Instead, abused women become the incarnation of prevailing gender 
stereotypes, such as “nagging bitch,” a woman with a “bad attitude,” or a castra-
ting female” (Marcus, 1994: 33).
3. Analysis
If one accepts the arguments in the previous section of this paper that domestic 
violence appears to share similar properties with torture and/or terrorism, the 
next step is to assess the utility of these broader human rights categorizations 
for the major actors involved with the violence - victim/survivors, perpetrators, 
and the state. Here similarities and differences among torture, terrorism, and 
domestic violence are relevant and important.
Insofar as the victim/survivor is concerned, both torture and terrorism are use-
ful categories in providing heightened public recognition not only to the levels 
and extent of physical pain and suffering, but also to psychological suffering and 
damage as well as other forms of coercion.  Arguably, given the condemnation 
of both torture and terrorism as reprehensible forms of violence, recognition 
of their similarities and connections to domestic violence may assist in captu-
ring public attention to domestic violence in its broader political context. Such 
recognition may enable us to pay closer attention to victim’s voices and stories. 
That said, for the victim/survivor there are differences between torture/terro-
rism and domestic violence. Though torture and terrorism can be imposed on 
both sexes, in ‘traditional’ torture situations, men are much more likely to be the 
targets and, thus, the preponderance of victim/survivors. In domestic violence 
situations, however, an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of women 
are the victim/survivors.14
In domestic violence situations, the perpetrator seeks to establish his dominance 
not only by terrorizing the victim but also by shaming her and degrading her 
in the eyes of others, so that she will be stigmatized and scorned should the 
crime be disclosed. (Herman, 2005: 200-201). Whereas, victims need social 
acknowledgement and support, in legal proceedings, should they seek redress, 
they endure a public challenge to their credibility. (Herman, 2005, 202). 
14  See Council of European Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against 
Women and Domestic Violence, Istanbul, 11v. 2011 Art. 2.1 Scope of the Convention.
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In addition, unlike domestic violence situations, where gender-inflected pro-
vocation is often attributed to the victim/survivor as a culturally accepted 
mitigating circumstance or explanation, torture and terrorism do not generate 
such excuses (Copelon, 1994: 361).
Insofar as understanding the status and actions of perpetrators of domestic 
violence is concerned, both torture and terrorism are useful categories. In both, 
men are overwhelmingly the perpetrators of the violence. The perpetrators’ 
acts of violence reveal the deliberate intent to control and coerce the victim(s) 
to conform in designated ways, to set an example, and to send a warning of the 
risks individuals run by failing to meet perpetrators’ desires, requirements, and 
demands. Likewise, the ample domestic violence literature discusses strategies 
of control and coercion indicative of perpetrators’ intent. In addition, in tradi-
tional torture and terrorism, perpetrators are not deterred by existing laws 
and legal systems. Given the contemporary extent and frequency of domestic 
violence, the same logic may apply to domestic violence perpetrators in many 
states, even those with laws on the books ostensibly punishing the violence. 
(WHO, 2002). 
Insofar as the role of the state in responding to domestic violence is concerned, 
torture or terrorism can be useful categories as well. Until now, however, they are 
not well integrated into political/legal discourse. Whereas torture and terrorism 
are highly politicized categories encompassing perpetrators’ accountability for 
their actions and consequences, until recent times, domestic violence has been 
a depoliticized category enabling custom to prevail and avoiding purposive 
gender-based dynamics of domination and subordination (Copelon, 1994: 328-
29). Unlike torture and terrorism, widely perceived as fundamental violations 
of individual and communities, gender-based domestic violence still is widely 
excused, thereby feeding men’s sense of entitlement, and the victim’s sense of 
culpability. (Copelon, 1994: 362). There is, however, growing recognition of the 
need for state action15 to protect victim/survivors and punish perpetrators 
by criminalizing domestic violence, providing civil remedies such as orders of 
protection and other safety measures, and acting with due diligence to effec-
tively implement the law so that victim/survivors can begin to trust the state. 
(Marcus, 1994: 32-34).  
Torture or terrorism by state agents can be stopped; torture or terrorism by 
non-state perpetrators can be eliminated through negotiations or more drastic 
militarized state action. Neither of these strategies work for domestic violence 
which is based on deeply rooted sex/gender inequalities. 
15  In Opuz v. Turkey (app.no.33401/02 (ECHR9  June 2009), the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg recognized this that state obligations to protect victims of domestic 
violence from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3.
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4. Summary
Both reframings of domestic violence, as torture or terrorism, jolt our cons-
ciousness and, hopefully, our conscience. They uncover the deep affinities of 
domestic violence with categories of violence that are universally condemned 
as human rights violations because they deny human dignity and integrity. They 
shock us into recognition of the extent to which domestic violence cannot be 
narrowly cabined or diminished or controlled by reliance on formal equality. 
They help us understand that domestic violence is a form of substantive gende-
red inequality - a societal distribution, at both individual and structural levels, 
of who does and is allowed to do what to whom. Domestic violence violates the 
rights of women who, like men, are entitled to integrity, security and dignity. It 
constitutes discrimination against women by maintaining both the individual 
woman and women as a class in an inferior and subordinated position within 
their respective societies.  
Consideration of domestic violence under the rubric of torture or terrorism 
is not designed to raise the threshold of what constitutes domestic violence. 
Nor does it entail the disregard for diminution of its consequences.  Nor does 
it undermine recognition of survivor/victim’s agency and resistance. Rather it 
provides greater space for the silenced voices of significant numbers of women 
by acknowledging their painful, shocking, lived experiences (WHO, 2002) and 
eliminating the normalization of their pain and trauma.  It helps in the worldwide 
campaign to change the nature of the specific behavior from acceptable to un-
lawful (Meyerfeld, 2010: 267).  
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Др Изабел Маркус,
Професор Правног факултета
Државни универзитет државе Њујорк, Бафало, САД 
Редефинисање концепта насиља у породици као 
акта тортуре или тероризма у породици
Сажетак
Нови дискурс у схватању насиља у породици, које се одређује као акт 
тортуре или тероризма у породици, преставља атак на нашу свест и има 
за циљ да је пробуди. Ова нова одређења разоткривају дубоку подударност 
насиља у породици са категоријама насиља које су предмет опште осуде, 
јер представљају повреду људских права и негацију људског достојанства и 
интегритета. На крајње алармантан начин она нас приморавају да схватимо 
до које мере насиље у породици не сме бити уско или олако схваћено, 
укалупљено или ограничено ослањањем на формалну једнакост полова. 
Ова нова схватања нам помажу да препознамо да је насиље у породици 
облик фактичке родне неједнакости која, како на индивидуалном тако 
и на структуралном нивоу, представља образац социјалне дистрибуције 
родних улога: шта је коме дозвољено или шта ко може да чини другоме. 
Насиље у породици представља повреду права жена које, као и мушкарци, 
имају право на поштовање личног интегритета, сигурности и достојанства. 
Насиље у породици представља и дискриминацију жена, под којом се 
подразумева инфериоран и подређен положај сваке жене понаособ и свих 
жена, као социјалне категорије у одређеном друштву. 
Успостављање новог оквира за редефинисање насиља у породици као 
акта тортуре или тероризма у породици није усмерено ка подизању нивоа 
онога што чини насиље у породици. Нови оквир нипошто не представља 
обезвређивање последица насиља у породици, нити има за циљ да на било 
који начин оспори социјално препознавање патње и отпора преживелог/
Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 67 | Година LIII | 2014
24
жртве. Он првенствено обезбеђује више простора да се чују ућуткани 
гласови великог броја жена које су биле изложене оваквим видовима 
насиља у породици, али представља и прилику да друштво спозна болна 
и застрашујућа искустава која су те жене преживеле (Светска здравствена 
организација, 2002) и спречи “тривијализацију” њихове патње, као и даљу 
трауматизацију. У светским размерама, нови оквир може да представља 
почетак заједничке акције која би довела до промене одређених облика 
понашања, који би од социјално прихватљивих постали неприхватљиви 
и незаконити. 
Кључне речи: насиље у породици, тортура, тероризам.
